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I. HUMAN RIGHTS LAW’S IMPERIAL AMBITIONS?
One of the most compelling storylines of this symposium, The Global Impact
and Implementation of Human Rights Norms, is that of the meteoric rise of
human rights law in importance, relevance, and force. In under a century, human
rights law has expanded its reach to labor, the environment, intellectual property,
corporate governance, and armed conflict. Appeals to human rights law, human
rights frameworks, and human rights language now seem ubiquitous.

* Associate Professor of Law, University of Georgia School of Law. Thank you to Linda Carter for
organizing the Symposium on The Global Impact and Implementation of Human Rights Norms, to Omar Dajani
for including me on “The Impact of a Wider Dissemination of Human Rights Norms: Fragmentation or Unity?”
panel, and to everyone at the University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law who helped make the
symposium so successful. Thank you also to Ryan Tuck and Jennifer Pridgeon for their invaluable research
assistance.
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What should we make of this rapid expansion? To some, human rights law’s
1
rise is a source of optimism. They see its spread into other areas of law as the
2
“humanization” of international law. Human rights law can provide a metanarrative, a set of unifying rules and principles that can stitch together a
3
4
fragmenting international legal system. Others, though, are less sanguine. To
them, human rights law’s imperial ambitions are a potential threat to international
5
law. Many areas into which human rights law has expanded are already
governed by longstanding, complex legal regimes, which may have already
developed their own frameworks for balancing various rights and
6
responsibilities. Human rights law is seen as an unnecessary, unwelcome
intruder into these areas; it seeds confusion into established law and threatens
7
even greater fragmentation of the legal order.
Is human rights law a source of fragmentation in international law? Can
human rights law be a source of unity? Although it may initially seem
paradoxical, I will suggest that the answer to both of these questions is yes. In
this short essay, I will make two broad arguments. First, the bad news: I will
argue that there are real tensions between human rights law and other areas of
international law, and that these tensions both contribute to and are reflective of a
broader fragmentation taking place within the international legal system.
Moreover, I will argue that the conflicts between human rights and other areas
suggest that the fragmentation runs much deeper and presents more serious
challenges for international law than is normally assumed. What human rights
law demonstrates is that it is not only the law that is fragmenting, but the legal
community itself. There is good news, however: my second argument is that even
as it contributes to international law’s fragmentation, human rights law may
actually hold the key to constitutionalization. Although human rights law may
not be able to undo fragmentation or will it away, it can nonetheless provide a
menu of techniques—a blueprint—for a constitutional conflicts regime that
might at least manage an already fragmented international law world.

1. See Ruti Teitel & Robert Howse, Cross-Judging: Tribunalization in a Fragmented but Interconnected
Global Order, 41 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 959, 964 (2009).
2. Id.
3. See id. at 964-65 (citing Ernst-ulrich Petersmann); see also Ruti Teitel, Humanity Law: A New
Interpretive Lens on the International Sphere, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 667, 670 (2008).
4. See Teitel & Howse, supra note 1, at 964, 966.
5. See id. at 966.
6. See id. at 667; Geoffrey S. Corn, Mixing Apples and Hand Grenades: The Logical Limit of Applying
Human Rights Norms to Armed Conflict, 1 J. INT’L HUMANITARIAN LEGAL STUD. 52, 53 (2010).
7. See Corn, supra note 6, at 54.
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II. THE FACES OF FRAGMENTATION
Before getting too deep into human rights law’s role in the fragmentation of
international law, a fuller discussion of the meaning of fragmentation is in order.
What is fragmentation? What is it that is fragmenting?
The basic account of fragmentation is by now familiar to international
lawyers. As international law has expanded, specialized bodies of law—
international environmental law, international human rights law, international
investment law, international criminal law—and specialized courts, tribunals, and
expert bodies have emerged. Almost inevitably, there have been areas of overlap,
and these specialized areas have come into conflict over what international law
means or requires. Human rights law has played a major role in this discussion.
Many of the most prominent conflicts over international law have pitted human
rights law against other areas of international law. Examples include human
rights law being pitted against the international trade regime in conflicts over the
8
availability of affordable medicines, against international investment law in
9
conflicts over development and indigenous rights, and against the law of armed
conflict (“LOAC”) in conflicts over the legality of targeted killings and proper
10
treatment of detained suspected terrorists. Further, human rights law seems
itself in constant danger of fragmenting, with multiple broad regional regimes
11
interpreting similar treaties, state courts interpreting their obligations under both
12
international law and state constitutions, and a variety of treaty bodies and
13
rapporteurs with overlapping mandates.

8. See Carmen Otero García-Castrillón, An Approach to the WTO Ministerial Declaration on the TRIPS
Agreement and Public Health, 5 J. INT’L. ECON. L. 212, 212-13 (2002) (“Essentially, developing countries
aimed at a recognition of freedom to adopt measures on public health grounds, particularly on access to
medicines, while developed countries instead pursued assurances that the rights and duties under the [TRIPS]
Agreement were not devalued.”).
9. See generally Amazon Defense Coalition: Ecuador Plaintiffs Appeal U.S. Court Decision on
Arbitration, BUS. WIRE (Mar. 18, 2010, 11:45 AM), http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20100318
006007/en/Amazon-Defense-Coalition-Ecuador-Plaintiffs-Appeal-U.S.
10. Marko Milanovi , Norm Conflict in International Law: Whither Human Rights?, 20 DUKE J. COMP. &
INT’L L. 69 (2009); Corn, supra note 6, at 70; Ruth Wedgwood, Combatants or Criminals?: How Washington
Should Handle Terrorists, 83 FOREIGN AFF., May-June 2004, at 126; see also Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R.,
Decision on Request for Precautionary Measures (Detainees in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba), Mar. 12, 2002, 41
I.L.M. 532, 532-33 (2002). See generally Evan J. Criddle, Proportionality in Counterinsurgency: A Relational
Theory, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2012).
11. Compare Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4,
1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, with International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S.
1976.
12. See, e.g., generally United States v. Burns, [2001] S.C.R. 283 (Can.) (on extradition to death penalty
state); Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v. Grootboom and Others 2000 (11) BCLR 1169
(CC) (S. Afr.) (on right to housing).
13. See, e.g., Secretariat, Concept Paper on the High Commissioner’s Proposal for a Unified Standing
Treaty Body, 8, U.N. Doc. HRI/MC/2006/2, (Mar. 22, 2006), available at http://www.un.org/Docs/
journal/asp/ws.asp?m=HRI/MC/2006/2.
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The recognition of this reality, and the confusion over what to do about it,
has led to a lot of handwringing. Over the past ten years, the fragmentation of
international law gathered significant attention. Reams of articles have been
14
15
written, a myriad of conferences have been organized, and the International
16
Law Commission (“ILC”) has even studied the problem and produced a report.
This attention has not necessarily made the problem clearer. In fact, the more we
talk about it, the more instances of fragmentation we find all around us, the less
clear it gets what we’re actually talking about.
Figuring out what to do about fragmentation, however, requires greater
clarity. We need a more precise account of the various phenomena that may be
going on. What exactly are we talking about when we discuss the fragmentation
of international law? What is it that is fragmenting? In fact, there are at least
three different types of fragmentation discussed in the fragmentation literature:
(1) Fragmentation of Interpretation or Jurisdiction, (2) Fragmentation of
Regulation, and (3) Fragmentation of the Legal Community.
A. Fragmentation of Interpretation or Jurisdiction
“Fragmentation of Interpretation” or “Fragmentation of Jurisdiction” is
perhaps the most straightforward version of the conflicts arising from the
expansion of international law into new areas. In this type of fragmentation, a
single body of law is interpreted differently by different bodies, tribunals, or
17
courts. Problems arise when each entity has or can claim jurisdiction over the

14. See, e.g., generally Sahib Singh, The Potential of International Law: Fragmentation and Ethics, 24
LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 23 (2011); REGIME INTERACTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: FACING FRAGMENTATION,
(Margaret A. Young ed., 2012); Margaret A. Young, Fragmentation or Interaction: The WTO, Fisheries
Subsidies, and International Law, 8 WORLD TRADE REV. 477 (2009); Teitel & Howse, supra note 1; PierreMarie Dupuy, A Doctrinal Debate in the Globalisation Era: On the “Fragmentation” of International Law, 1
EUR. J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2007); Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Justice as Conflict Resolution: Proliferation,
Fragmentation, and Decentralization of Dispute Settlement in International Trade, 27 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L.
273, 366 (2006); Mario Prost, All Shouting the Same Slogans: International Law’s Unities and the Politics of
Fragmentation, 17 FIN. Y.B. INT’L L. 131 (2006); William W. Burke-White, International Legal Pluralism, 25
MICH. J. INT’L L. 963, 970 (2004); Andreas Fischer-Lescano & Gunther Teubner, Regime-Collisions: The Vain
Search for Legal Unity in the Fragmentation of Global Law, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 999 (2004); Jenny S.
Martinez, Towards an International Judicial System, 56 STAN. L. REV. 429, 449-53 (2003); Tullio Treves,
Conflicts Between the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea and the International Court of Justice, 31
N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 809 (1999).
15. See, e.g., Symposium, The Normalizing of Adjudication in Complex International Governance
Regimes: Patterns, Possibilities, and Problems, 41 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 755 (2009); Symposium,
Diversity or Cacophony?: New Sources of Norms in International Law, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 845 (2004);
Symposium, The Proliferation of International Tribunals: Piecing Together The Puzzle, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L.
& POL. 679 (1999).
16. Rep. of the Study Group of the Int’l L. Comm’n, 58th sess, May 1-June 9,
July 3-Aug. 11, 2006, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 [hereinafter ILC Report].
17. Martti Koskenniemi, Fragmentation of International Law, INT’L L. COMMISSION, http://untreaty.
un.org/ilc/sessions/55/fragmentation_outline.pdf (last visited Mar. 8, 2012).
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18

same dispute and no legal body has effective authority to overrule the others.
Examples might include the disagreements between the International Court of
Justice (“ICJ”) and the Israeli Supreme Court over the legality of Israel’s West
19
Bank wall/barrier/fence, between the ICJ and the United States (“U.S.”)
Supreme Court over the proper interpretation of the Vienna Convention on
20
21
Consular Relations in Avena and Sanchez-Llamas, and between the ICJ and the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) over the
22
proper rules for attribution of acts to a state in an armed conflict.
B. Fragmentation of Regulation
A second type of fragmentation, “Fragmentation of Regulation,” occurs
when different legal regimes, each with their own bodies of rules, seem to govern
23
the same conduct. Sometimes these regimes are quite similar, as might be the
24
case with two regimes regulating food safety. Sometimes the regimes might use
25
similar sounding concepts but with somewhat different meanings. Examples
include the concept of proportionality in human rights law and international
26
humanitarian law, and the concepts of due process in human rights law and
27
denial of justice in international investment law. Sometimes these regimes may
have completely conflicting philosophies. This is arguably the problem
underlying disputes between international trade and human rights law over the
production of generic drugs. Trade law, via the Trade-Related Aspects of

18. Id.
19. Compare Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 201-03 (July 9), with HCJ 2056/04 Beit Sourik Village Council v.
Government of Israel 58(5) PD 807 [2004] (Isr.), and HCJ 7957/04 Mara’abe v. Prime Minister of Israel 58(2)
PD 393 [2005] (Isr.).
20. Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12, 71-73 (Mar. 31).
21. Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 347-50 (2006).
22. Compare Prosecutor v. Tadi , Case No. IT-94-1-T, Judgment, ¶ 131 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia July 15, 1999) (setting out the “overall control” test), with Military and Paramilitary Activities in
and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Merits, Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, 64-65 (June 27) (setting out an
“effective control” test), and Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), 2007 I.C.J. 43 (Feb. 26) (reasserting “effective control test
after Tadi ).
23. See, e.g., Koskenniemi, supra note 17.
24. Compare Jacob Færgemand, International Organization for Standardization [ISO], The ISO 22000
Series: Global Standards for Safe Food Supply Chains, 4 (May–June 2008), available at
http://www.iso.org/iso/iso22000_ims_08-3.pdf (standards set by the ISO on food safety), with Welcome, CODEX
ALIMENTARIUS COMMISSION, http://www.codexalimentarius.net/web/index_en.jsp (last visited Mar. 9, 2011)
(standards set by the Alimentarius Commission on food safety).
25. See, e.g., Koskenniemi, supra note 17.
26. See generally Criddle, supra note 10.
27. See Andrea K. Bjorklund & Sophie Nappert, Beyond Fragmentation 18 (U.C. Davis Legal Studies
Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 243, 2011).
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28

Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPs”) Agreement, focuses on protecting
intellectual property and the incentive to innovate, while human rights law
29
focuses on the health of individuals in developing states. This may also be the
case with disagreements between investment law and human rights law or
environmental law. The former focuses on protecting investors’ rights against
expropriation, whereas the latter focus on protecting citizens against unregulated
30
or under-regulated corporate actions. The problem in these examples is that
regulated actors may face conflicting demands from these different regimes.
Without some clear relationship between them, it may be impossible to determine
which rules to follow.
These first two types of fragmentation suggest that conflicts could be solved
31
32
through doctrine. The right jurisdictional rules, rules of treaty interpretation, or
33
doctrinal tweaks might resolve any conflicts over the meaning or application of
the rules. This was, in fact, the approach adopted by the ILC in its eventual report
34
on fragmentation. The battles between human rights law and other areas,
however, suggest the possibility of a third, deeper version of fragmentation.

28. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Legal Instruments – Results of the Uruguay
Round, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 at pmbl. (1994); G.A. Res. 60/251, ¶¶ 3-5, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/251
(Apr. 3, 2006).
29. See Harlan Grant Cohen, Finding International Law, Part II: Our Fragmenting Legal Community,
44 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 38) [hereinafter Finding, Part II]. See
generally García-Castrillón, supra note 8, at 212 (describing debates over balance of interests in key trade
documents); Steve Charnovitz, The Legal Status of the Doha Declarations, 5 J. INT’L ECON. L. 207, 207 (2002);
James Thuo Gathii, The Legal Status of the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health Under the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 291, 291 (2002).
30. See, e.g., Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing
Public International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1521, 1591-92 (2005)
(“Investment treaties do not prevent Sovereigns from passing legislation related to health, safety, and welfare.
Rather, these treaties provide incentives for Sovereigns to act in a manner that does not violate public
international law and is free from inappropriate expropriation, discrimination, and the like. Should they violate
the obligations they have undertaken, Sovereigns pay compensation for the resulting harm.”). See generally
United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm, Swed., June 5-16, 1972, Declaration of the
United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14/Rev/1, reprinted in 11
I.L.M. 1416 (1973); United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janiero, Braz., June
3-14, 1992, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, princ. 2, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/5/Rev.1 (June
13, 1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 874 (1992).
31. See, e.g., Karel Wellens, Fragmentation of International Law and Establishing an Accountability
Regime for International Organizations: The Role of the Judiciary in Closing the Gap, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L.
1159, 1167 (2004) (suggesting a broader role for the ICJ); see also Franck, supra note 30, at 1617-25 (arguing
for investment arbitration court of appeals to establish clear precedents that arbitral tribunals can then follow).
32. See, e.g., Jörg Kammerhofer, Systemic Integration, Legal Theory and the ILC, 19 FINNISH Y.B.
INT’L L. 157 (2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1534086 (discussing the
technical approach of the international law commission).
33. See Anthea Elizabeth Roberts, Traditional and Modern Approaches to Customary International
Law: A Reconciliation, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 757, 762 (2001) (describing the problem of instant custom and
suggesting a way to reconcile it with international law doctrine).
34. ILC Report, supra note 16, at 244.
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C. Fragmentation of Legal Community and “Legitimacy Rules”
35

As I have developed in other articles, legal systems can be seen as a
function of two types of rules. The first type, legitimacy rules, are deeply
internalized rules, often focused on process, that provide standards against which
36
other purported rules in the system will be judged. In international law, the
legitimacy rules might explain what counts as a binding agreement, what
evidence is needed to legitimate a customary practice as law, or dictate when
37
such an agreement must be followed. A second type of rules, legitimated rules,
38
are rules built on the foundation of these legitimacy rules. Such rules are treated
39
as law because they meet the standards set forth by legitimacy rules. In
international law, agreements that meet internalized standards of formality,
40
determinacy, assent—traditionally, treaties and custom—are legitimated rules.
Seen through this lens, a legal community can be seen as a group that shares a set
of legitimacy rules. It is that shared understanding of what counts as law that
allows it to cohere and to have a shared sense of what is lawful and what is
unlawful.
At first glance, conflicts between human rights and other areas may look like
conflicts over interpretation—debates over production of generic drugs might
41
turn on the proper reading of the TRIPs Agreement and the Doha Declaration,
or conflicts over regulation—whether human rights standards or international
humanitarian law standards govern counterinsurgencies and counterterrorism
42
actions. However, if we look more closely at what’s really being debated, it
seems that the arguments are over something deeper and more fundamental.

35. See generally Finding, Part II, supra note 29; Harlan Grant Cohen, Can International Law Work? A
Constructivist Expansion, 27 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 636 (2009) [hereinafter Cohen, Can International Law
Work?]; Harlan Grant Cohen, Finding International Law: Rethinking the Doctrine of Sources, 93 IOWA L. REV.
65 (2007) [hereinafter Finding International Law].
36. Finding International law, supra note 35, at 71.
37. Finding, Part II, supra note 29, at 12; Finding International Law, supra note 35, at 71.
38. Can International Law Work?, supra note 35, at 669; Finding International Law, supra note 35, at
71.
39. There may also be some substantive rules that are themselves directly internalized by actors in the
legal system and thus, do not rely on legitimacy rules to be treated as law. In international law, prohibitions on
slavery and genocide might fall into such a category. See Finding, Part II, supra note 29, at 11; Can
International Law Work?, supra note 35, at 669.
40. As I explain elsewhere, there is fluidity between these two categories. A rule of international
humanitarian law, e.g., the prohibition on wanton destruction, might be treated as law by some actors in the
international system because they have directly internalized that norm. Others though may not have internalized
that rule but still treat it as law because it is embodied in an agreement, the Geneva Convention, that meets their
internalized standards of legitimacy. For a deeper discussion of the relationship between these types of rules,
see Finding, Part II, supra note 29, at 12.
41. See generally García-Castrillón, supra note 8; Charnovitz, supra note 29; Gathii, supra note 29.
42. See Milanović, supra note 10, at 125; Corn, supra note 6, at 77-78; Comm’n on Human Rights, Rep.
on its 60th Sess., Dec. 22, 2003, U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ESCOR], ¶ 29, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2004/7 (Mar.
24, 2004). See generally Criddle, supra note 10.
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Traditionally, in international law, the legitimacy rules would have included
the list of sources in Article 38 of the International Court of Justice’s Statute—
43
specifically, treaties, customs, and general principles —as well as their
44
underlying basis in state consent. It is not at all clear, however, that these
legitimacy rules are still shared with human rights law. Across human rights
doctrine, the role of consent seems minimized. States appear to have less room to
calibrate their consent by reserving to or withdrawing from treaties; a la carte
45
consent to treaties no longer appears to be an option. State practice—the
theoretical implied consent behind customary international law—seems to be of
diminishing relevance; state statements and other traditional elements of opinio
46
juris appear to be playing a greater role. Overall, human dignity, as opposed to
47
state consent, increasingly appears to be the touchstone of human rights law.
Thus, the conflicts between human rights law and traditional international
law seem to run much deeper than mere disagreements over interpretation. On
the contrary, it appears that the community of human rights law no longer accepts
the same legitimacy rules as traditional international law, suggesting that human
rights law has emerged as a separate legal community. Nor does human rights
law appear to be alone. This observation could be expanded to other areas,
48
including investment law, international criminal law, and international
49
environmental law.

43. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, ¶ 1, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 33 U.N.T.S.
993. Article 38 lays out the set of sources the ICJ should apply in deciding the cases before it but is often treated
as a broader authoritative statement of international law’s sources. See MARK W. JANIS & JOHN E. NOYES,
CASES AND COMMENTARY ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 20–21 (2d ed. 2001) (“An ordinary starting point for
international lawyers from most any part of the globe when thinking about the formal sources of international
law is Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.”).
44. See, e.g., Duncan B. Hollis, Why State Consent Still Matters--Non-State Actors, Treaties, and the
Changing Sources of International Law, 23 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 137, 141 (2005) (“[M]ost international
lawyers continue to explain how these rules constitute law by referring to the notion that ‘the general consent of
states creates rules of general application.’” (citing IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
LAW 4 (6th ed. 1995))).
45. See Finding, Part II, supra note 29, at 21-23; U.N. Human Rights Comm,, General Comment No.
24: Issues Relating to Reservations Made Upon Ratification or Accession to the Covenants or the Protocols
Thereto, or in Relation to Declarations Under Article 41 of the Covenant, para. 18, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6 (Nov. 4, 1994), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/453883fc11.html;
U.N. Human Rights Comm., CCPR General Comment No. 26: Continuity of Obligations, para. 5, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.8/Rev.1 (Dec. 8, 1997), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/45388
3fde.html.
46. Finding, Part II, supra note 29, at 19.
47. For a deeper discussion of the emerging legitimacy rules of human rights law, see supra at Part II.A.
48. Id. at 29-31.
49. Daniel Bodansky, Does One Need to Be an International Lawyer to Be an International
Environmental Lawyer?, 100 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 303, 304 (2006).
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III. FACING FRAGMENTATION
If this diagnosis is correct—if human rights law has in fact emerged as a
different legal community with different notions of legitimacy and legitimate
lawmaking—a different course of treatment is in order. The sorts of doctrinal
tweaks and jurisdictional rules suggested by the ILC report assume that
50
conflicting interpretations are arising within a single legal system. In essence,
such suggestions assume that the best analogy for human rights and trade are
51
contracts and tort. Both areas of law arise within a single larger legal system,
and that legal system can provide the rules for mediating conflicts between them.
To the extent though that we’re talking about different legal communities, to
the extent these disputes go to questions about legitimate rulemaking—the who
and how of international law—the relationship between California law and
52
Jewish law is the better analogy. In such cases, there is no shared doctrine that
might authoritatively resolve disputes between them. The governing framework
53
in such situations is conflicts of law; resolving disputes requires finding ways to
54
mediate between the demands of different legal communities.
IV. TOWARDS A CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS REGIME
So where does this leave us? Interestingly, it is here, in the recognition of
international law’s dissolution into separate communities, that fragmentation’s
relationship to another popular topic in international law, constitutionalization,
becomes clear. Like fragmentation, the constitutionalization of international law
has become something of an academic obsession, with a spate of books and
55
conferences on the topic. Also like fragmentation, the term means a variety of
different things to different people and may describe a variety of different
56
phenomena within international law. But at least one of the roles constitutions

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

See ILC Report, supra note 16, at 30-32.
See generally id. at 65-101.
See Finding, Part II, supra note 29, at 44.
See id. at 40.
See id.
See, e.g., generally RULING THE WORLD?: CONSTITUTIONALISM, INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE (Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Joel P. Trachtman eds., 2009); JAN KLABBERS, ANNE PETERS &
GEIR ULFSTEIN, THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2009); Symposium, Global
Constitutionalism from an Interdisciplinary Perspective, 16 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 385 (2009).
56. Jeff Dunoff and Joel Trachtman’s taxonomy of constitutionalization, for example, includes three
functions constitutional norms play and seven mechanisms used to implement them. RULING THE WORLD?:
CONSTITUTIONALISM, INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 55, at 10-24. See Daniel
Bodansky, Is There an International Environmental Constitution?, 16 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 565, 56773 (2009) (asking what the term means and suggesting that it may confuse more than clarify).
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play is as a conflicts regime, articulating how conflicts between actors, norms, or
57
levels of government in a regime are to be decided.
Human rights law may be able to help here. Constitutions resolve these
conflicts in a number of ways, and human rights law has experimented with
many of them. As mentioned above, human rights law has long faced the
potential for fragmentation within its own field and has had to find its own ways
to manage its complex community of communities—broad international treaties
58
and treaty bodies, regional regimes, and national courts, to name a few. Human
rights law’s experiments may prove useful in constructing a conflicts regime for
international law. In fact, many of the techniques developed within human rights
59
law have started to gain traction in other areas of international law. Three
techniques are of particular interest in resolving conflicts between different areas
of international law: (1) Constitutional Comity Rules, (2) Constitutional
Hierarchy Rules, and (3) Constitutional Abstention Rules.
A. Constitutional Comity Rules
One way constitutions resolve conflicts within a regime is by dictating when
certain actors will have to grant comity to the decisions of other actors. The Full
60
Faith and Credit Clause of the U.S. Constitution is an example of such a rule,
one that dictates the comity one state within the federal system must grant to the
decisions of another. In human rights law, such constitutional comity rules have
61
taken the form of requirements to exhaust local remedies and doctrines like
62
63
64
margins of appreciation, subsidiarity, and complementarity. Each of these
rules is designed to grant a certain amount of space to other actors (usually states)
65
to operate in their own way.

57. See, e.g., generally RULING THE WORLD?: CONSTITUTIONALISM, INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 55; KLABBERS ET AL., supra note 55; Symposium, Global Constitutionalism
from an Interdisciplinary Perspective, supra note 55.
58. See supra notes 8-13.
59. See infra notes 67-69.
60. U.S. CONST. art. IV § 1.
61. See Nsongurua J. Udombana, So Far, So Fair: The Local Remedies Rule in the Jurisprudence of the
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 7 (2003) (“Consequently, major
human rights instruments, both global and regional, have incorporated the general international law rule of
exhaustion of local remedies.”).
62. See, e.g., Douglas Lee Donoho, Autonomy, Self-Governance, and the Margin of Appreciation:
Developing a Jurisprudence of Diversity within Universal Human Rights, 15 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 391, 450-66
(2001).
63. See, e.g., generally Paolo G. Carozza, Subsidiarity as a Structural Principle of International Human
Rights Law, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 38, 42-43 (2003).
64. See, e.g., Mohamed M. El Zeidy, The Principle of Complementarity: A New Machinery to Implement
International Criminal Law, 23 MICH. J. INT’L L. 869, 870 (2002).
65. See RULING THE WORLD?: CONSTITUTIONALISM, INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE, supra note 55, at 32-35 (describing the constitutional roles played by such doctrines).
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These rules, originally developed by bodies like the European Court of
66
Human Rights, have started to trickle into other areas of international law. A
number of scholars have argued that states should be granted a margin of
67
appreciation on implementing intellectual property rules or investment
68
obligations, and Yuval Shany has argued that margins be applied by
69
international courts more generally. One can imagine bodies responding to the
broader problem of fragmentation by adopting such an approach, essentially
granting some level of deference to other regimes in their interpretation of
70
specific issues.
B. Constitutional Hierarchy Rules
A second way that constitutions can resolve conflicts is through
constitutional hierarchy rules. Such rules operate as trumps, taking the form of
supremacy clauses that dictate when certain rules will prevail over others or of
71
fundamental rights that cannot be violated. In human rights law, jus cogens and
non-derogable rights play this sort of role, establishing basic, impassable
72
boundaries around state discretion.
Human rights law has also experimented with importing such rules into other
systems to create a common baseline across international and national law. The
most common way in which this has taken place has been through the human73
rights-influenced interpretation of state constitutions and other forms of

66. See Donoho, supra note 62, at 450-66. See generally Handyside v. United Kingdom, App. No.
5493/72, 1 Eur. H.R. Rep. 737 (1976), 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1976).
67. See Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Copyright Lawmaking Authority: An (Inter)Nationalist Perspective on
the Treaty Clause, 30 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 355, 388 (2007); Laurence R. Helfer, Adjudicating Copyright
Claims Under the TRIPs Agreement: The Case for a European Human Rights Analogy, 39 HARV. INT’L L.J.
357, 404-05 (1998).
68. See William W. Burke-White & Andreas von Staden, Private Litigation in a Public Law Sphere:
The Standard of Review in Investor-State Arbitrations, 35 YALE J. INT’L L. 283, 333-44 (2010).
69. See generally Yuval Shany, Toward a General Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in International
Law?, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 907, 907 (2005).
70. Though applying such rules would hardly be without problems. See Finding, Part II, supra note 29,
at 45-46.
71. See RULING THE WORLD?: CONSTITUTIONALISM, INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE, supra note 55, at 19-20.
72. See KLABBERS ET AL. supra note 55, at 10-11, 26 (discussing views that attributed constitutional
status to jus cogens norms).
73. See, e.g., State v. Makwanyane and Another 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) at 22-27 (S. Afr.) (invoking
international human rights in interpreting South African constitution); Soobramoney v. Minister of Health
(Kwazulu-Natal) 1998 (1) SA 765 (CC) 8-12 (S. Afr.) (same); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575-78 (2005)
(invoking international human rights in interpreting the U.S. Constitution); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558,
568 (2003) (same); see also KLABBERS ET AL., supra note 55, at 10-11 (“A court in, say, Switzerland
proclaiming the prohibition of torture is a matter of jus cogens may not intend to be, somehow, constitutional;
but it could not reach this judgment without the earlier attempts by international lawyers to constitutionalize
international law through the creation, promulgation, and endorsement of the concept of jus cogens.”).
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74

transnational judicial dialogue. But there are examples of human rights law’s
influence across a variety of regimes. International investment tribunals, for
example, have looked to human rights law to help interpret “denial of justice”
75
guaranties in investment treaties. Further examples of the importation of human
76
rights baselines can be found in international humanitarian law, international
77
78
criminal law, and international trade.
The key to the success of these trans-substantive forays has been a
willingness to accept the imperfect translation from human rights to other areas,
to accept that the careful constructions of human rights bodies will be
misunderstood, misapplied, and mutated by other bodies, tribunals, and courts.
This might seem odd. Why shouldn’t human rights law demand fidelity to the
specific rules it has developed?
As noted before, when talking about human rights law and other areas of law,
we are actually talking about different legal regimes with different notions of
legitimate lawmaking. In a sense, the relationship between human rights law and
trade law is best analogized to the relationship between U.S. and French law; in
either case, arguments for a particular rule developed in one system, based on
that system’s doctrines and that system’s values, are likely to ring hollow in the
other system without something more. To be persuasive, arguments that a
particular system should adopt a particular rule must be made using that system’s
logic. To borrow an example from another panel at this symposium, Americans
can argue as long as they want for their version of free speech, but it is unlikely
to be adopted in France until it can be translated into French. The same holds true
across international law—fair trial rights need to be translated into denial of
justice terms before they can influence investment law.
This may mean that norms are imperfectly translated from one community to
the next. But to the extent that some common consensus can be distilled across
different normative communities, that consensus can begin to form the
foundation of an international constitution. Paradoxically, it is only by
encouraging or accepting fragmentation—here, in terms of different
interpretations of particular rules—that broader constitutional rules can emerge.
Examples of this process are easy to find. A number of scholars have argued that
74. See generally Melissa A. Waters, Mediating Norms and Identity: The Role of Transnational Judicial
Dialogue in Creating and Enforcing International Law, 93 GEO. L.J. 487 (2005).
75. See Bjorklund & Nappert, supra note 27; see also Andrea K. Bjorklund, Reconciling State
Sovereignty and Investor Protection in Denial of Justice Claims, 45 VA. J. INT’L L. 809, 861-66 (2005).
76. See generally Theodor Meron, The Humanization of Humanitarian Law, 94 AM. J. INT’L L. 239
(2000).
77. See Cecilia M. Bailliet, Towards Holistic Transnational Protection: An Overview of International
Public Law Approaches to Kidnapping, 38 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 581, 601 (2010) (“The international
protection of human rights is occasionally viewed as a legal basis for filing (sic) the gaps which still exist in
international criminal law and also to complement international criminal law.”).
78. See generally Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Human Rights, International Economic Law and
‘Constitutional Justice,’ 19 EUR. J. INT’L L. 769 (2008).
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human rights law’s concept of human dignity has begun to appear as a trans79
substantive standard across international law. Ruti Teitel and Rob Howse have
argued that a “humanity” norm has emerged across various areas of international
80
law through a process of “cross-judging.” A similar example might be the
concept of due process that has migrated from human rights to global
81
administrative law and other areas. The European Court of First Instance’s
consideration of due process, as a potential jus cogens norm in the Kadi case
concerning United Nations Security Council sanctions against individuals, is
particularly notable in this regard because it shows the way such trans82
substantive rules might emerge.
C. Constitutional Abstention Rules
A final type of constitutional conflicts rule forces normative conflicts into the
arena of political debate by drawing strict jurisdictional boundaries between
different regimes or actors. Federalism and the political question doctrine (with
its basis in separation of powers) play this type of role in the U.S. context. The
idea here is that certain normative or policy debates cannot or should not be
resolved through legal doctrine, but instead must be resolved politically.
In human rights law, a sort of federalism might be emerging in the form of
regional human rights treaties and regimes. The European Convention and Court
of Human Rights; the Inter-American Convention, Commission, and Court; and
83
the African Charter, Commission, and Court all generally operate within their
84
own ambit, neither reviewing nor being reviewed by each other. Although each
regional regime involves similar, and sometimes identical, rights and duties
(though there are also significant differences), their interpretation, jurisprudence,
85
and implementation is tied to a specific treaty with specific parties. To the
extent these regimes diverge over the interpretation of a similar norm,
79. See, e.g., id. at 771; Meron, supra note 76, at 267.
80. See Teitel & Howse, supra note 1, at 968-77.
81. Benedict Kingsbury, The Concept of ‘Law’ in Global Administrative Law, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 23, 44
(2009) (“Several major human rights treaties specify due process rights that have been important in the review
and reform of national administrative procedures affecting individuals. . .”).
82. Joined Cases C-402/05 P & C-415/05 P, Yassin Abdullah Kadi & Al Barakaat Int’l Found. v.
Council & Comm’n, 2008 E.C.R. I-6351; see also Finding, Part II, supra note 29, at 39-41, 44-46.
83. The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights is monitored by the African Commission on
Human and Peoples’ Rights and by a court, formerly the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, now the
African Court of Justice and Human Rights.
84. U.N. OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS & INT’L BAR ASS’N, NO. 9, HUMAN
RIGHTS IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE: A MANUAL ON HUMAN RIGHTS FOR JUDGES, PROSECUTORS AND
LAWYERS 1 (2003).
85. See Steven R. Ratner, Regulatory Takings in Institutional Context: Beyond the Fear of Fragmented
International Law, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 475, 522 (“International law lives with much diversity across regimes,
most obviously in the willingness of different human rights bodies to interpret identical words in different texts
differently, a result that flows from the aims of the regimes and the traits of the institutions.”).
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convergence will only happen when one regime persuades the others of the
wisdom of its rule or its logic.
Outside human rights law itself, we might expect that debates between areas
of international law, for example, human rights law and trade law or human
rights law and international humanitarian law, will have to be resolved in these
86
ways. Courts and other interpretive bodies in each area will apply their law to
the issues before them. Their success in gaining broader acceptance of their
interpretations will rise and fall on the attractiveness of the rule they adopt or the
persuasiveness of their reasoning. The Inter-American and European human
rights bodies will have to convince the broader international community of the
87
attractiveness of applying a human rights framework to counterinsurgency; the
World Trade Organization (“WTO”) will have to persuade the broader
community that its rulings best balance trade and other important interests in
88
health, environment, and human rights.
V. CONCLUSION
These three constitutional conflicts tools begin to point to a post-international
law world in which general international law is replaced by global constitutional
precepts, and in which fragmentation is not so much resolved as it is managed.
Recognizing these tools, however, is only a first step. The hard question is when
to choose each one of these types of rules. And while there may be some general
principles—the closer the normative agreement, the more room for developing
trans-substantive norms or for granting a level of comity, the less agreement, the
more things may need to be resolved through politics—much more needs to be
done to figure this out.

86. See Finding, Part II, supra note 29, at 47-49.
87. See generally Isayeva, Yusupova, & Bazayeva v. Russia, App. Nos. 57947/00, 57948/00, 57949/00,
41 Eur. H.R. Rep. 39 (2005); Isayeva v. Russia, App. No. 57950/00, 41 Eur. H.R. Rep. 38 (2005); Bámaca
Velásquez Case, Judgment of the Court Inter-Am Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 70, ¶ 208 (Nov. 25, 2000); Las Palmeras
Case, Judgment on Preliminary Objections, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 67, ¶ 33 (Feb. 4, 2000); Kaya v.
Turkey, App. No. 22535/93, 2000-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 149 (2000); Juan Carlos Abella v. Argentina, Case 11.137,
Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., No. 55/97, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.95, doc. 7 (1997).
88. Teitel & Howse, supra note 1, at 983-88.
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